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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The problem of increasing imports of subsidized renewable electricity from neighbouring coun-
tries and Member States of the EU, undermining level playing fields for power plants in Switzer-
land, can be addressed by means of preferential taxation of electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources. Both under WTO law and the rules of the 1972 Free Trade Agreement, distinc-
tions may be drawn on the basis of production and process methods (PPMs), provided the same 
rules apply to domestic and imported electricity produced with similar methods. Differential taxa-
tion can be implemented on the basis of green electricity certificates which need to be made 
available alike to domestic and foreign producers. A privilege exclusively granted to domestic 
producers cannot be lawfully sustained. Also, quantitative restrictions on the eligibility of certifi-
cates cannot be properly justified. Restrictions based on qualitative criteria could be defended on 
environmental grounds as long as they objectively apply to both domestic and imported electrici-
ty alike. 
The paper recommends adopting a system comparable to the UK model of renewable electricity 
exemption scheme under the Climate Change Levy, in place since 2001. In contrast to an electric-
ity tax system based on guarantees of origin (GOs) discussed in the legal opinion dated April 18, 
2014, the value added of the UK model based on tax exemption certificates consists in permitting 
to condition the eligibility of electricity tax exemptions based on qualitative criteria designed ac-
cording to the Swiss environmental legislation (or industry/technology standards).  
To the extent that considerations of industrial policy dominate the motivation, rather than the 
promotion of green electricity, measures could be adopted on the basis of countervailing duties, 
offsetting foreign subsidies granted. Also, recourse to safeguard measures, albeit limited in time, 
can be contemplated. As Switzerland has little experience in taking recourse to trade remedies, a 
proper methodology taking into account WTO law would need to be developed and communicat-
ed in advance. Finally, efforts should be made to address the issue in negotiations with the Euro-
pean Union and Member States. Both unilateral measures relating to differential taxation as well 
as trade remedies may be used as an argument to bring about a settlement with exporting coun-
tries of subsidized electricity.  
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1. Mandate  
 1.1  Background  
The Swiss government examines the introduction of an electricity tax with differentiated tax rates 
for grey and green electricity. The tax would equally apply to domestic and imported electricity 
sold in the domestic market. The consumption of renewable electricity would be encouraged 
through tax exemptions upon submission of certificates certifying the renewable source of elec-
tricity. The scheme discussed is in pursuit of the Energy Strategy 2050 and part of the transition 
from a renewable energy support system mainly relying upon state funding, to a renewable ener-
gy steering system purely based on market mechanisms.   
The scheme raises legal and practical questions under international law, in particular in relation to 
certificates of origin which form an inherent and necessary part of it in order to determine the 
origin of the electricity. As the scheme may not eliminate all distortions introduced by extensive 
subsidization abroad, recourse to trade remedies in terms of flanking measures are to be exam-
ined.  
 1.2  Objectives and tasks  
An earlier legal opinion on differentiated electricity taxation alluded to a national certification 
scheme which could be established for the purposes of differentiated electricity taxation.1 Subject 
to the fulfilment of certain certification criteria, both domestic and foreign producers of green 
electricity would have access to such a certification scheme for the purposes of receiving exemp-
tions from, or reductions of, an electricity tax. The first task of the study is to elaborate on the de-
sign features of a certification scheme for differentiated electricity taxation, which meets the re-
quirements under WTO law and the 1972 FTA between Switzerland and the EU.   
A certification scheme that provides equal access to tax reductions or exemptions for domestic 
and foreign renewable energy producers is unlikely to create a level playing field between Swiss 
producers of renewable electricity, particularly hydropower plants, and their foreign counterparts, 
given the fact that the latter receive extensive subsidies under various renewable energy support 
schemes in their home countries. Our second task, therefore, is to examine the lawfulness of re-
stricting the availability of tax exemption certificates for foreign renewable energy producers.   
The third task of the study aims to examine flanking or alternative measures based upon trade 
remedies under international law, in particular the law on safeguards and the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing duties, taking into account the Swiss-EU 1972 Free Trade Agree-
ment.  
1  Thomas Cottier et al., Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and 
the Swiss-EEC Free Trade Agreement, WTI / Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek (Bern April 18, 2014), available at:  
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf?lang=de& 
msg-id=50122.  
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2. The Scheme of Renewable Electricity Tax Exemptions   
Differential taxation essentially requires the determination of the source and origin of the electric-
ity benefitting from the tax break. Within the EU, a scheme of particular interest to this effect was 
introduced by the United Kingdom. It is briefly described below. To the best of our knowledge, 
the scheme has not been contested under EU law. It thus offers important guidance.   
 2.1  Certification scheme based on the UK model  
Seeking to promote energy efficiency and to facilitate the attainment of climate policy goals, the 
UK government introduced the Climate Change Levy (CCL) in 2001. It is an excise tax imposed 
on electricity and some fossil fuels (coal, gas and liquefied petroleum gas). The CCL is paid per 
kilowatt hour of electricity or per unit (kilogram) of fossil fuel to Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) Office at the time of supply to industrial and commercial consumers of ener-
gy).2 It shows variable tax rates for different types of fuels, ranging ad valorem from 6.1% on 
coal to 16.5% on natural gas.3 Revenues from the CCL are partly recycled back to the industry 
through a 0.3% reduction of the employers’ National Insurance Contributions4, and partly di-
verted to the Carbon Trust, an institution, which fosters research and promotion of energy effi-
ciency and renewable energy sources.  
Importantly, the CCL not only applies to domestically produced electricity, but also to imported 
electricity. For electricity and fossil fuels imported from EU countries, the CCL is payable at the 
time of supply to industrial or commercial consumers in keeping with the principles of the single 
market. For electricity and fossil fuels imported from countries outside the EU, the CCL is pay-
able at the time of importation and included in the importer’s customs declaration.  
2  For more details on the CCL and other policy instruments deployed in the UK to promote renewable energy, see 
Cottier et al., Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and the 
Swiss-EEC Free Trade Agreement, WTI / Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, pp.  19-22, available at: 
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf?lang=de& 
msg-id=50122; Ralf Martin et al. (2009), The impacts of the Climate Change Levy on business: evidence from mi-
crodata, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 7 and Grantham Research Institute 
on Climate Change and the Environment Working Paper No. 6, available at  
http://www.cccep.ac.uk/Publications/Working-papers/Papers/1-9/Working_Paper7.pdf (last visited 10 February 
2015).  
3  It should be noted that while the CCL establishes a meaningful price incentive for energy efficiency overall, indi-
vidual CCL rates created a perverse effect in that the carbon contained in gas and electricity is taxed at almost twice 
the rate of carbon contained in coal. Some explain this by political pressures arising from historical ties between the 
Labour Party and the coal industry, which had suffered from the dash for gas over the 1990s. See Martin R. et al. 
(2009), The Impacts of Climate Change Levy on Business: Evidence from Microdata, 
http://www.bruegel.org/fileadmin/bruegel_files/Website_images/Funded_research_projects/ECE_folders/Event_1_ 
280909/Paper_contribution_28.09.2009.pdf (last visited 10 February 2015).  
4  First introduced by the National Insurance Act 1911, the UK National Insurance (NI) is a system of contributions 
paid by workers and employers. The so-called National insurance Contributions (NICs) determine eligibility for 
certain state benefits (e.g. state pension) and are collected by the Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC), which 
is a non-ministerial department of the UK Government.  
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The CCL scheme provides for exemptions for green electricity, irrespective of its origin.5 For the 
implementation of the CCL exemptions, a separate electricity certification system has been in-
troduced. The certification is done by Great Britain’s Office of Gas and Electricity Markets or 
the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation in the form of Renewables Levy Exemp-
tion Certificates (Renewables LECs). These certificates are issued for each complete MWh of 
renewable electricity produced by an accredited installation located in the UK or abroad. Elec-
tricity from renewable sources is then acquired by an electricity utility and offered for sale to an 
industrial or public sector consumer under the terms of a renewable source contract.6  
2.1.1 Main traits of an electricity tax exemption scheme based upon the UK model   
As suggested in the legal opinion on differential taxation of electricity, differentiated electricity 
tax rates may be implemented through a certification scheme for renewable electricity based on 
the UK model.7 Tax exemption certificates (TECs) based on the UK model of levy exemption 
certificates (LECs) would be different from all other RE electricity certificates circulated in the 
market in so far as they would be used only for the tax exemption or tax reduction purposes. Sup-
pliers of domestic and imported green electricity in the Swiss market would be fully or partly ex-
empted from an electricity tax for the amount of TECs (e.g. a TEC can be issued for 1 MWh of 
green electricity) which they could redeem. 
Based on the UK model, TECs could be issued to the Swiss electricity producers by a Swiss-
based certification body upon the verification of the source of the electricity produced. The certi-
fication body is still to be determined. This could be either the Swiss Federal Office of Energy, or 
a mandated institution. To obtain accreditation and to apply for TECs, an electricity generator 
would need to register with a certification body through an electronic account and provide regular 
(monthly) data on its generation of green electricity. TECs would be granted only to green elec-
tricity coming from accredited Swiss or foreign generators. In order to be certified, a power plant 
(Swiss or foreign) would need to fulfil certain requirements. The audit, i.e. the assessment of 
5      Note that the UK exports/imports electricity only to/from EU Member States (whereas gas comes mainly from 
Norway, but also from the Netherlands and Belgium, and coal mainly from Russia but also from the US and Co-
lombia). The UK has three electricity interconnectors (to/from France, the Netherlands and Ireland) that are used 
for importation and exportation of electricity. Until recently the interconnector with France was used solely for im-
ports and the one with Ireland solely for exports. This pattern has changed since 2008 with more exports to France, 
fewer exports to Ireland and some imports from Ireland. In 2011, imports from France were 6 terawatt hours and 
exports were 1 terawatt hour. Imports from the Netherlands were 3 terawatt hours and exports below 1 terawatt 
hour. Trade with Ireland was less than 1 terawatt hour in either direction. See http://www.nemo-
link.com/pdf/Nemo-Link-Interconnector-EN.pdf and Bolton P. (2013), Energy imports and exports, Standard 
Notes for UK Parliament, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-
papers/SN04046/energyimports-and-exports- (last visited 10 February 2015).  
6  See OFGEM, Applying for accreditation and claiming LECs, available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmental-programmes/climate-change-levy-
exemption/informationgenerators/applying-accreditation-and-claiming-lecs (last visited 10 February 2015).  
7  Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU 
Law and the Swiss-EEC Free Trade Agreement, WTI / Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, available at:  
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf?lang=de& 
msg-id=50122, at 62.  
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whether a power plant meets the requirements, would be done by an accredited independent audi-
tor. Also foreign auditors could be accredited. The auditor would check if all certification criteria 
were met. The certification body would review the assessment report of the independent auditor 
and issue the certificates (in case all requirements are met).   
Once TECs have been issued to accredited generators, they can be transferred from, or sold by, 
generators to suppliers who will then provide the TECs to a tax authority as a piece of evidence in 
order to fully or partly exempt the supply of electricity from taxation. Electricity suppliers would 
allocate or redeem TECs obtained from generators through an electronic account opened for sup-
pliers.  
The advantage of a differentiated electricity tax scheme based on TECs is that it addresses the 
problem of heterogeneity pertinent to all other RE certificates (e.g. GOs and green certificates) is-
sued in different jurisdictions. Although GOs can accompany physical flows of electricity togeth-
er with TECs, the double counting should not happen since the two certificates will serve differ-
ent purposes (only TECs will be accepted for tax exemptions). In addition, the issuance of TECs 
will be governed based on specific criteria by a Swiss certification body. 
2.1.2 Consistency with WTO law, the provisions of the Swiss-EU FTA and Directive 
2009/28/EC  
The effect of an electricity tax scheme based on the UK model on suppliers of foreign green elec-
tricity is neutral, as long as it is open and applies on equal terms to domestic and foreign electrici-
ty installations. The legal issues are similar to those discussed in previous opinions. 8 While elec-
tricity is a like product, whatever its mode of production, distinctions based upon process and 
production methods (PPMs) are acceptable under WTO law subject to the fulfilment of the sub-
stantive and procedural conditions for justification under the health and/or environmental excep-
tions of the GATT.9As foreign producers within the same categories of processing electricity (re-
newables v. non-renewables, old v. new plants) are not treated less favourably, the principles of 
non-discrimination and equal level playing fields are respected. The final assessment will depend 
upon the modalities of the measure based upon objective criteria and whether efforts were made 
to find a negotiated solution under Article XX GATT. We do not expect major WTO and FTA is-
sues to arise in implementing this option. Importantly, there is nothing to prevent Switzerland 
from introducing TECs as part of an electricity tax scheme in the exercise of its regulatory auton-
omy in comparison to EU law and in accordance with policies of euro compatibility of Swiss law. 
As a measure aimed at promoting the use of energy from renewable sources by reducing the cost 
of that energy, a TEC scheme qualifies as a “support scheme” within the meaning of the Directive 
2009/28/EC, just like the green certificates used by several EU Member States.10 It follows that 
8  See Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO law, 
EU law and the Swiss-EEC Free Trade Agreement, and Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), CO2 Levies and Tariffs on 
Imported Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility of Options with WTO law, EU law and the Free Trade Agreement 
Switzerland-EEC.  See also a discussion of WTO law and EU law implications of TECs in the WTI study for 
Swisscleantech (forthcoming).   
9  Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO law, EU 
law and the Swiss-EEC Free Trade Agreement, at 67-71. 
10  See Article 2 (k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC.   
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Switzerland would not be obliged to link such a scheme with the existing markets for RECs in the 
EU. In this respect, the Ålands Vindkraft ruling offers clear guidance. The ECJ recognized that, 
“as the EU law currently stands, such a territorial limitation may in itself be regarded as necessary 
in order to attain the legitimate objective pursued in the circumstances, which is to promote in-
creased use of renewable sources in the production of electricity”.11 Although this conclusion re-
lates to the admissibility of the territorial limitation of the energy obligation support scheme 
based on green certificates adopted in Sweden, the reasoning of the Court is based on the consid-
eration that “EU law has not harmonized the national support schemes for green electricity”.12 In 
other words, the ECJ starts from the premise that green electricity support scheme authorized un-
der the Directive 2009/28/EC have not been harmonized. It thus allows for domestically defined 
schemes; TECs are no exception to this consideration. A TEC scheme implemented in Switzer-
land would not need to be linked with other renewable certificates schemes. Besides, TECs per-
forms functions different from other RECs. The merger of different systems would thus create 
confusion: EU green certificates, for instance, are used to implement a renewable quota obliga-
tion support scheme, and do not grant tax exemptions. 
Should Switzerland accept to be bound by the terms of the Directive 2009/28/EC within the con-
text of a future Electricity Agreement,13 the Confederation thus could still introduce its own green 
certificates within the meaning of Article 2 (k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC. Similar to its func-
tion in some of the EU Member States, the green certificates would then serve as a support 
scheme in order to facilitate the implementation of a renewable quota obligation for the purposes 
of fulfilling the mandatory national target for renewables under Article 3 of the Directive 
2009/28/EC.  
Based on the Ålands Vindkraft ruling, Switzerland would again be free to design such a scheme as 
a purely national scheme limited to green certificates produced on its own territory. However, 
green certificates as such could not be used to also grant tax exemptions, as in this case solely the 
green electricity produced in the Swiss territory would qualify for the tax exemptions, thereby 
running afoul to Article 13 FTA or corresponding special treaty obligations based upon Article 34 
TFEU, as explained in section 4.1.1 below. As green certificates cannot substitute for TECs, un-
der this scenario Switzerland would still need to introduce a TEC in parallel to a green certificate 
scheme.  
 2.2  Certification scheme with adjustments for subsidized imports  
To level a playing field between the Swiss and foreign producers of renewable electricity, a na-
tional certification system for electricity tax exemptions could include special requirements for 
the certificates. These requirements are still under discussion, but it is conceivable that “hydro 
power plants would need to fulfil the minimum residual water flows (cf. Water Protection Act, 
Article 31, Para. 1 and 2) other provisions of Water Protection Act, Environmental Protection Act 
11   C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, cit., para. 92.   
12  Ibid., para. 94 (emphasis added).   
13  Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity, cit., at 20.   
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(EPA) or any provisions on landscape conservation. Only non-supported/subsidized facilities, 
power plants may get certificates.”14  
In the next section, we examine the legal feasibility of a national certification system (NCS) that 
foresees the introduction of restrictions on the access of foreign renewable electricity producers to 
NCS based on quantitative or qualitative criteria.  
2.2.1 Analysis of quantitative limitations  
Under the first scenario, the number of TECs eligible for tax exemptions would be limited by 
means of a quota imposed on TECs issued to foreign (EU) installations. Consequently, TECs is-
sued to Swiss electricity producers will always qualify for the tax exemptions whereas ‘foreign’ 
TECs will be granted the tax exemption only to the extent that they are not over quota.   
The exclusion of electricity produced at foreign installations from the tax exemption, when ex-
ceeding a certain fixed thresholds, potentially favours the production and consumption of domes-
tic green electricity to the disadvantage of imported electricity. The fact that different tax condi-
tions are attached to domestic and foreign electricity depending on their origin could induce an 
increase in the demand for electricity produced from Swiss installations that received TECs. In 
this respect, such a quantitative limitation would discourage the importation of green electricity.  
The actual implications on trade in electricity of quantitative limitations would depend on the 
specific modalities of implementation of such a tax design option. Particularly it depends on the 
manner by which the quota is administrated. A quota on ‘foreign’ TECs admitted for the purposes 
of tax exemptions, for instance, could be fixed at the national level and then proportionally allo-
cated to each Swiss supplier. Alternatively it could either be set in such a way as to correspond to 
a certain fixed percentage of the total TECs eligible for tax exemption for each Swiss supplier, or 
to a progressive percentage depending on the proportion of the total volume of green electricity 
imported by Swiss suppliers.  
While TECs do not regulate the physical flow of electricity and quotas do not formally amount 
per se to an import restriction for electricity, they nevertheless create incentives which may result 
in enhanced de facto limitations of imports of electricity. Inasmuch as a measure limiting the eli-
gibility of TECs affects the physical volumes of green electricity imported into Switzerland, it is 
thus likely to impinge on both the Free Trade Agreement and related WTO law provisions regu-
lating trade in goods, as discussed below.   
a. FTA and European Union law  
Under the EU legal framework and within the EU, the implications on trade in electricity linked 
to the introduction of a quota on the eligibility of ‘foreign’ TECs for tax exemptions may run 
counter to the principle of free circulation of goods and, in particular, impinge on Article 13 FTA 
and corresponding provisions following Article 34 TFEU. Article 34 TFEU prohibits any 
“[q]uantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect […] between 
Member States”. Measures running counter to Article 34 TFEU, however, may still be justified 
14  As described in the BFE note of August 14, 2014.    
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on one of the public interest grounds recognized under Article 36 TFEU15 or on the grounds of 
environmental protection, which the ECJ case law has consistently considered to constitute an 
overriding requirement.16  
Within the EU, the applicability of Article 34 TFEU to cases where a restriction on foreign elec-
tricity arises out of the selective use of electricity certificates was recently confirmed by the ECJ 
in the judgment Ålands Vindkraft addressed above.17 The measure at issue in the Ålands Vindkraft 
dispute was an RE obligation support scheme introduced by Sweden under the Directive 
2009/28/EC,18 which relied on the use of green certificates awarded solely to domestically pro-
duced green electricity. For the ECJ, the exclusion of green electricity produced outside of Swe-
den from the scope of the domestic renewable support scheme was “indirectly capable of promot-
ing trade in electricity from Sweden in that suppliers may have an additional incentive to acquire 
electricity from Swedish producers because the latter are also able to provide them with the certif-
icates that those suppliers need in order to fulfil their quota obligations”.19 According to the ECJ, 
the existence of such a possibility was sufficient to encourage “the establishment of contractual 
relationships – in some cases, on a long-term basis – concerning the supply of national electricity 
by those producers to suppliers or electricity users”20. The Court thus considered that the Swedish 
scheme constituted a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports 
within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU21 because “the effect of the support scheme at issue…is, 
at least potentially, to curb electricity imports from other Member States”22, especially green elec-
15   Article 36 TFEU states: “The provisions of Articles 34 and 35 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on im-
ports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protec-
tion of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic 
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Mem-
ber States.” Measures aimed at stimulating the share of green electricity supplied and/or consumed domestically 
could then in principle be defended under the ‘public health’ exception recognized in Article 36.   
16  Although the ‘protection of the environment’ is not explicitly mentioned in Article 36 TFUE, EU Member States 
have increasingly resorted to environmental justifications, and a consistent body of ECJ jurisprudence has recog-
nized it to be an overriding mandatory requirement under which it is possible to defend limitations to the principle 
of free movements of goods. Case C-2/90 Commission v. Belgium (1992) ECR I-4431, Case 302/86 Commission v. 
Denmark (1988) ECR 4607, Case C-473 Toolex (2000) ECR I-5681 and Case C-379/98 PreussenElektra (2001) 
ECR I-2099.  
17  Under this scheme, however, both Swedish suppliers and electricity users importing electricity were under the obli-
gation to surrender annually a certain number of green certificates corresponding to a certain proportion of the total 
amount of electricity that they had supplied or used. C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. En ergimyndigheten, cit., pa-
ra. 55.  
18  See Section 2.1.3.   
19  C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, cit., para. 28.   
20  C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, cit., para. 72 (emphasis added).  
21 Ibid., para. 75. The Court based its conclusion on a substantial body of past jurisprudence interpreting Article 34 
TFEU on the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on importation. See, 
among others, from Case C-379/98 PreussenElekta (2001) ECR I-2099 and the case law therein cited.  
22 Ibid., para. 73.   
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tricity imports.23 It thus turned to analyse whether the scheme at issue was justified on the 
grounds of environmental protection. It concluded that the Swedish scheme could indeed be de-
fended as a measure responding to considerations relating to the protection of the environment as 
it could be proportional to this goal24, irrespective of the fact that the tradable certificates were 
awarded to green electricity producers solely for the green electricity produced in the Swedish 
territory.25  
A fortiori, the same reasoning also applies to the 1972 Swiss-EU Free Trade Agreement. The 
measure amounts to a quantitative restriction essentially banned under Article 13 para. 1 of the 
Agreement. It may be justified under the exceptions of Article 20 FTA for similar reasons as 
within the EU. To the extent that the measure is justified under EU law, the same holds true of the 
FTA. The latter, however, reaches less far, and it may be that measures not found compatible with 
the TFEU are acceptable under the FTA. The latter requires actual trade restrictions while the 
former already excludes the possibility of restrictions.26 Policy space under the FTA is thus 
somewhat larger than within the EU.   
The Ålands Vindkraft ruling offers considerable guidance in the assessment of compliance of a 
quota imposed on the eligibility of foreign TECs for tax exemptions, with EU law and the 1972 
FTA.27 The measure in fact presents various analogies with the Swedish green certificates at issue 
in the Ålands Vindkraft case in terms of its effects on trade in electricity. It in fact results in an in-
centive for Swiss suppliers to purchase domestically produced green electricity with the effect of 
impeding imports of green electricity. It is therefore very likely that a quota on foreign TECs eli-
gible for tax exemptions would qualify as a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative re-
strictions inconsistent with Article 34 TFEU and Article 13 para 1 FTA.  
23 Ibid., para. 75.  
24  According to a substantial body of ECJ case law, a measure inconsistent with Article 34 TFEU could justified on 
environmental protection grounds insofar as it complies with the principle of proportionality, i.e. it must be appro-
priate for ensuring the attainment of the objective pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary for fulfilling 
that objective. See, for instance, Case C-524/07 Commission v Austria (2008) ECR I-187, para. 54 and the jurispru-
dence therein cited.  
25   C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ft. 18, paras. 83-119. The ECJ, in particular, recognized that 
“as the EU law currently stands, such a territorial limitation may in itself be regarded as necessary in order to attain 
the legitimate objective pursued in the circumstances, which is to promote the use of renewable energy sources in 
the production of electricity”. C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ft. 18, para. 92 (emphasis ad-
ded). Among the considerations leading the ECJ to this conclusion is the fact that “EU law has not harmonized the 
national support schemes for green electricity [i.e. including the green certificates schemes used to implement na-
tional renewable energy obligation support schemes within the meaning of Article 2 (k) of the Directive 
2009/28/EC]”. C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, ft. 18, para.94.   
26 See Thomas Cottier et al, Die Rechtsbeziehungen der Schweiz und der Europäischen Union, Bern 2014 pp. 229240.  
27   It should be noted that the ECJ judgement for the first time did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate General. 
According to the Advocate General Bot, while the Swedish national renewable energy support scheme complied 
with the RES Directive, but Article 3(3) of the Directive 2009/28/EC was in breach of the principle of the free 
movement of goods to the extent that it permits a Member State to deny or restrict access to its national support re-
gime to producers whose plants are situated in other Member States. C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyn-
digheten, Opinion of the Advocate General Bot, 28 January 2014.   
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The introduction of tax exemptions for green electricity based on the submission of TECs can be 
relatively easily defended as a measure aimed at promoting the use of electricity from RE sources 
with a view to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and combating climate change.28 How-
ever, proving that a quota needs to be imposed solely on foreign TECs for the purpose of tax ex-
emptions in order to achieve such a legitimate goal is more difficult. It can in fact be argued that 
the goal of environmental protection can be pursued without the need to stimulate an increase in 
the share of domestically produced green electricity. Granting tax exemptions upon submission of 
TECs of all origins, in itself, induces Swiss suppliers to conclude contracts concerning the supply 
of green electricity. In other words, a quota imposed solely on foreign TECs is difficult to justify 
on environmental grounds as it inherently favours the national production of green electricity to 
the detriment of green electricity of foreign origin.   
This conclusion holds true irrespective of the fact that the Ålands Vindkraft ruling admitted the 
national support scheme implemented by Sweden on environmental protection grounds. True, the 
Swedish scheme scrutinized in the Ålands Vindkraft ruling does present some similarities with the 
measure under review, as both measures exclude – completely in the former case and partially in 
the latter case (i.e. for the part of foreign TECs exceeding the quota)29 – that the green electricity 
produced outside the national territory benefits from the same treatment accorded to nationally 
produced green electricity on environmental grounds. Yet, the analogies end here. In the Ålands 
Vindkraft case, the measure at issue was, in fact, an RE obligation support scheme based on green 
certificates within the meaning of Article 2 (k) of the Directive 2009/28/EC. In other words, the 
green certificates introduced by Sweden were aimed at fulfilling the mandatory national quota for 
the production of green electricity within the terms of Article 3 (1) and Article 5 (1) and (3) of the 
Directive 2009/28/EC. They were used to implement a purely national support scheme which was 
allowed to be territorially limited by terms of the RES Directive.30 In the case under review, the 
partial exclusion of foreign green electricity from tax exemptions would not correspond to the 
need to fulfil national mandatory targets for the production of green electricity within the mean-
ing of the RES Directive on the part of a country imposing such a limitation (in the present case – 
Switzerland).  
In conclusion, it is unlikely to replicate the approach adopted in the Ålands Vindkraft judgment in 
order to justify a quota imposed on foreign TECs for the purpose of tax exemptions on grounds 
related to protection of the environment.   
28   See Case C-379/98 PreussenElekta (2001) ECR I-2099, paras. 73–75.   
29  The volume of imported green electricity de facto excluded from the tax exemptions would depend on the stringen-
cy of the quota fixed for the eligibility of foreign TECs.  
30  More precisely, the ECT stated that: “[s]ince, in particular, EU law has not harmonized the national support 
schemes for green electricity, it is possible in principle for Member States to limit access to such schemes to green 
electricity located in their territory”. C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v. Energimyndigheten, cit., para. 94. At the 
same time, the European Commission has recently approved a German renewable energy law which allows foreign 
(i.e. not German) renewable energy producers participating in the German renewable energy support scheme and 
making them eligible for  FITs to the same extent as domestic green electricity producers. European Commission 
Press Release, ‘State aid: Commission approves German renewable energy law EEG 2014’, 23 July 2014, available 
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-867_en.htm.  
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b. WTO law  
Under the WTO legal framework, the implications of a quantitative limitation on TECs eligible 
for tax exemptions are likely to impinge on the obligation of general elimination of quantitative 
restrictions under Article XI:1 GATT. The provision outlaws both import “prohibitions” and im-
port “restrictions … whether made effective through quotas, import … licenses or other 
measures”.   
The exclusion of foreign TECs from the tax exemption when they exceed a certain fixed thresh-
old could be considered as a “measure” ultimately amounting to a “restriction…on importation” 
of green electricity within the meaning of Article. XI:1 GATT. Existing WTO case law has in fact 
consistently interpreted the expression “other measures” in connection with the term “restriction” 
as to significantly expand the scope of the provision, including not solely a category of measures 
that may be considered formal quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, but also a whole variety of 
means insofar as they impose a limiting condition on trade, i.e. they reduce the volume of imports 
(or exports).   
In India – Autos, in particular, the Panel suggested that the term “restrictions” encompasses all 
measures imposing a condition that has a limiting effect.31  In Colombia – Ports of Entry, the pan-
el opined that Article XI:1 would also cover “measures which create uncertainties and affect in-
vestment plans, restrict market access for imports or make importation prohibitively costly”.32 In 
China – Raw Materials, the panel further added that any measure having “the very potential to 
limit trade… constitute[s] a ‘restriction’ within the meaning of Article XI:1 of the GATT 1994”.33 
Based on past jurisprudence, the introduction of a quota on the number of foreign TECs eligible 
for the tax exemption/reduction is likely to be considered a measure having a limiting effect on 
importation within the meaning of Article XI:1 GATT inasmuch as it creates uncertainties with 
respect to eligibility of foreign TECs for the purposes of tax exemptions. It would thus negatively 
affect the competitive opportunities of green electricity produced outside Switzerland compared 
to domestically produced electricity accompanied by Swiss TECs for the purpose of securing eli-
gibility for tax exemptions.34  
Furthermore, Article XI:1 GATT is not the only provision that may be relevant for assessing the 
legal feasibility of quantitative limitations on foreign TECs eligible for tax exemptions. A viola-
31  Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, circulated on 21 December 2001, WT/DS/146/R 
and WT/DS/175/R, para. 1.14.  
32  Panel Report, Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry, adopted on 20 May 2009, 
WT/DS366/R, para. 7.240.  
33  Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, circulated on 5 July 2011, 
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R and WT/DS398/R, para. 7.1081.   
34  This conclusion holds true if one considers that in Colombia – Ports of Entry the panel specified that the limiting ef-
fect on importation would not need to be proved based on the specific trade effects of a measure given that “chang-
es in trade volumes result not only from governmental policies, but also from other factors, and that, in most cir-
cumstances, it is not possible to determine whether a decline in imports following a change in policies is attributable 
to that change or to other factors”. Panel Report, Colombia – Ports of Entry, cit., para. 7.254. Hence, it would not be 
necessary to quantify the impact determined by the preference of domestic over foreign TECs on the volume of 
green electricity imports for the purpose of proving the violation of Article XI:1 GATT.   
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tion of the national treatment rule under Article III:4 GATT may arise to the extent that a more 
favourable treatment would be granted to Swiss suppliers submitting TECs of Swiss origin ob-
tained by purchasing green electricity produced domestically instead of importing it from abroad. 
This would modify the conditions of competition in Switzerland between imported and domestic 
green electricity to the detriment of the former.35   
Moreover, designing an electricity tax scheme in such a way that tax exemptions would be fully 
available to domestic green electricity upon submission of Swiss TECs while making it possible 
to exclude imported green electricity accompanied by foreign TECs exceeding the quota may 
create problems with its justification under Article XX (b) and (g) GATT.36 Recourse to the 
GATT exceptions might be needed to justify the imposition of an electricity tax based on pro-
cesses and production methods (PPM) and also the possible discriminatory effects on foreign 
green electricity compared to domestic green electricity discussed above.37 As a quota imposed 
on foreign RE TECs for the purposes of tax exemptions would ultimately discourage green elec-
tricity imports while stimulating the production of green electricity in Switzerland, the question is 
whether the preference for domestic over foreign green electricity could be considered “necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health” under Article XX (b) GATT, or “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” within the meaning of Article XX (g) 
GATT. The necessity test imposed under Article XX (b) renders a justification of a quota im-
posed solely on foreign TECs practically impossible, as the use of electricity from renewable 
sources in Switzerland’s electricity mix could be promoted just as effectively by exempting do-
mestic and foreign green electricity alike. Likewise, a successful defence under Article XX (g) 
seems unlikely given that this Article requires that the measure at issue is taken “in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. In this respect, the quota on TECs eli-
gible for tax exemptions would have to be imposed on both domestic and foreign GOs alike and 
not solely on non-Swiss TECs. Finally, even if provisionally justified under either of the excep-
tions, the quota on foreign TECs will need to fulfil the requirements of the chapeau of Article 
XX. According to the chapeau, a measure shall not constitute “a means of arbitrary or unjustifia-
ble discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction 
on international trade”. Very recently, the WTO’s Appellate Body discussed at length the impli-
35  A detailed analysis of the case law interpreting Article III:4 GATT and a thorough explanation of its applicability to 
a quantitative limitation imposed on GOs for the purposes of tax exemptions were given in Thomas Cottier et al. 
(2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and the Swiss-
EEC Free Trade Agreement, WTI / Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, available at:  
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf?lang=de& 
msg-id=50122, at 55.   
36  The conditions for seeking justification under such exceptions were thoroughly discussed in Thomas Cottier et al. 
(2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity, cit., at 35–36.   
37 The likeness issue of grey and green electricity and the problems which may arise from the differential treatment 
accorded to various types of electricity were analysed in Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Elec-
tricity, cit., at 24–27. See also Kateryna Holzer et al. ‘Promoting green electricity through differentiated electricity 
tax schemes’, Background paper prepared for the World Trade Forum 2014 on “International Trade in Electricity 
and the Greening Economy”, WTI 26-27 September 2014, forthcoming. 
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cations of the analysis under the chapeau in the EC – Seal Products dispute.3839 In particular, it 
clarified that the chapeau “entails an assessment of whether the ‘conditions’ prevailing in the 
countries between which the measure allegedly discriminates are the same”.40 Accordingly, Swit-
zerland would need to prove that the “conditions” prevailing domestically, on the one hand, and 
in the EU (or in any country potentially exporting electricity to Switzerland), on the other hand, 
are “relevantly different”.41 It seems unlikely that Switzerland could rely on the existence of the 
tax exemptions to argue that its domestic conditions are different than those prevailing in the EU 
Member States where different green electricity promotion schemes are widespread, e.g. in the 
form of green certificates or even in the form of levy exemption certificates as in the case of the 
UK. Based on WTO jurisprudence, because the quota on foreign TECs would result into discrim-
ination between countries where the same conditions exist, the reason for such discrimination 
should have a link to the objective reflected by Article XX (b) and (g) GATT.42 However, as al-
ready noted, the reason for discriminating against imported green electricity in favour of domestic 
green electricity does not seem to relate directly to public health or environmental protection con-
siderations, as the use of electricity from renewable sources would be promoted just as effectively 
by measures incentivizing the consumption of green electricity irrespective of its origin. For all 
the foregoing reasons, a quota imposed on foreign TECs eligible for tax exemptions would likely 
run afoul of GATT provisions.   
Finally, the scenario under scrutiny does not seem to raise additional compatibility problems un-
der the TBT Agreement so long as the use of TECs for the purposes of tax exemptions does not 
touch upon the issues of certification of electricity.  
 
2.2.2 Analysis of qualitative restrictions  
Under the second scenario, the admissibility of TECs for tax exemptions would be limited by the 
introduction of qualitative criteria, abstaining from quantitative restrictions discussed above. Such 
criteria would apply to both Swiss and foreign (EU) TECs alike, on the basis of Swiss standards. 
In other words, Swiss suppliers submitting either type of TECs will qualify for tax exemptions to 
the extent that they fulfil certain qualitative criteria which may entail different policy goals, in 
particular environmental concerns. In principle, it would also be possible to differentiate even be-
tween new and old plants, so long as the defining criteria are objective (environment-related) and 
38 The requirements imposed by the chapeau have been examined in detail in Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differen-
tial Taxation of Electricity, cit., at 36–37 and Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), CO2 Levy or Tariff on Imported Electric-
ity: Assessing Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and the Free Trade Agreement Switzerland–EEC, 
WTI/Heuking Kühn Lüer Wojtek, available at 
http://www.bfe.admin.ch/php/modules/publikationen/stream.php?extlang=en&name=en_756795622.pdf, at 31- 
39 .  
40 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal 
Products (EC Seal Products) adopted 22 May 2014, WT/DS400/AB/R , WT/DS401/AB/R, para. 5.317.  
41  Ibid, para. 5.299.   
42   Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil–Retreaded Tyres), adopted 
20 August 2009, WT/DS332/AB/R, para. 227.  
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apply on equal terms to domestic and imported green electricity and the distinction between old 
and new plants is based on the fulfilment of these criteria  
There are two ways to implement qualitative criteria. One is where the physical flows criteria ap-
ply only at the exemption stage. In this case, tax exemptions will apply to green electricity con-
sumed in Switzerland (domestic or imported electricity) and thus will not apply to Swiss pro-
duced exports of green electricity. The other way is where the physical flows criteria apply at the 
initial stage of determining the tax base. This means that the tax itself will not concern Swiss 
green electricity produced for exports. 
a. Tax exemptions 
One qualitative criterion for the model of tax exemption could consist in linking TECs to physical 
flows of electricity, as in the UK system. In this case, only TECs coming from Swiss-based in-
stallation, which correspond to electricity produced and consumed in Switzerland (i.e. not export-
ed to other countries) and only foreign TECs, which correspond to green electricity actually im-
ported and thus consumed in Switzerland would be eligible for the tax exemptions.  
The basic underlying rationale of such an option is different to the option relying on quantitative 
limitations on foreign TECs. In the latter case, the idea behind the introduction of a quota on for-
eign TECs is to limit the granting of a tax exemption when green electricity is not produced on 
the Swiss territory. In the former case, the idea is to exempt from the tax the green electricity ac-
tually consumed on the Swiss territory. This fundamental difference seems to better reflect the 
environmental goal of stimulating the use of electricity from renewable sources in Switzerland’s 
electricity mix.43  
b. Determination of tax base 
To the extent that the physical flows criteria applies only at the exemption stage, however, tax ex-
emptions granted upon submission of TECs would only apply to green electricity consumed in 
Switzerland (domestic or imported electricity) but could not apply to Swiss-produced green elec-
tricity destined for exports. One option to obviate this problem could be to implement the physi-
cal flows criterion at the initial stage of determining the tax base. This means that the tax itself 
will not concern Swiss green electricity produced for exports from the very outset, as such elec-
tricity will be subject to the tax regime of the importing country.  
c. Criteria related to physical flow of electricity 
The limitation on the admissibility of TECs for the purposes of taxation based on a proven physi-
cal flows criterion applied to both domestic and imported (but not exported) electricity is not like-
ly to raise compatibility problems with WTO law, EU law and the FTA. It is in fact a formally 
objective, country-neutral criterion that permits to use TECs as a tool to extend a domestic tax re-
gime to imports in such a way as to treat domestic and foreign green electricity alike in the do-
43  From an environmental perspective, it is irrelevant whether the increase in the production of green electricity occurs 
on the territory of Switzerland or elsewhere due to the global nature of climate change.   
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mestic market.44 For such reason, it does not entail any violations of relevant WTO and FTA pro-
visions regulating trade in goods. Moreover, because such a criterion would be equally applicable 
to Swiss and foreign TECs accompanying green electricity flows in a way similar to labels, no 
additional legal hurdles would arise out of the WTO TBT Agreement. 
Another qualitative criterion upon defining the tax base excluding exports could consist in grant-
ing the tax exemption for domestic consumption upon the fulfilment of specific ecological re-
quirements, such as those existing under green electricity labels. In parallel to the development of 
green certificates systems for tax purposes, a whole range of different electricity labels has been 
introduced to serve the function of disclosing information on different quality aspects of electrici-
ty to consumers.45 Green electricity labels are issued by a specific certification body upon request 
of electricity installations provided they fulfil sustainability requirements under the labelling 
scheme. Green electricity labels are thus attached to the physical flows of electricity produced by 
certified electricity installations. The main difference between green certificates and green elec-
tricity labels is that the former certify the green origin of electricity per kWh, whereas the latter 
provide information on the sustainability footprint of the electricity plants, including their envi-
ronmental impacts, social and economic criteria and various process criteria. Green electricity la-
bels are usually based on the ISO requirements for ‘Environmental labels or eco-labels’ (ISO 
14025:2006). Under ISO 14025:2006, different countries have developed various labelling 
schemes for renewable electricity, which provide consumers with information on the environmen-
tal impacts of the electricity generation process. In Switzerland, two main labelling systems are 
used for green electricity: ‘naturemade’ and TÜV SÜD. Swiss consumers can choose among the 
certified green electricity types ordering electricity directly from electricity suppliers. This market 
segment is still relatively small, however.46 
The idea behind this option is clearly to restrict the availability of tax exemptions not simply to 
green electricity as such (i.e. CO2-free electricity generated from renewable sources) but more 
specifically to green electricity produced in an ecologically sustainable manner.47 
Although in principle this criterion would be applicable to both Swiss and foreign TECs, depend-
ing on the choice of a label, de facto problems of discrimination against imported green electrici-
ty under both the WTO and the EU legal frameworks for trade in goods may arise. For instance, 
‘naturemade’ labels certify almost half of all renewable electricity products in Switzerland48 but 
44 Under this design option, what would be excluded from tax exemptions would only be TECs not linked to the im-
portation of green electricity, while imported green electricity would be accorded the same tax treatment as would 
be accorded to Swiss green electricity.   
45   PriceWaterhouseCoopers & WWF (2009), Green Electricity Making a Difference. An International Survey of Re-
newable Electricity Labels, May 2009.  
46   In 2009, it accounted for 8% of the entire consumption of electricity in Switzerland, PriceWaterhouseCoopers & 
WWF (2009), Green Electricity Making a Difference. An International Survey of Renewable Electricity Labels, 
May 2009, p. 87.  
47   Green electricity labels in fact take into account a wider range of requirements concerning ecological, social, organ-
izational and professional factors. See Naturemade Swiss Quality Label: A Top Global Brand, available at 
http://www.naturemade.ch/Dokumente/Kommunikation/PWC-Report-kurz-e.pdf.   
48  PriceWaterhouseCoopers & WWF (2009), Green Electricity Making a Difference, cit., at 87.   
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they are not diffused to other countries.49 This means that TECs qualifying for tax exemptions 
will almost exclusively be those of Swiss origin, whereas EU TECs would hardly qualify for tax 
exemptions.   
In these cases, the implications for trade in electricity will be similar to those arising out of the in-
troduction of a formal quota on foreign TECs eligible for tax exemptions. The introduction of 
such a qualitative criterion is thus likely to entail a violation of Article 13 FTA , as well as Article 
III:4 and Article XI:1 GATT, while posing similar problems of justification under the relevant 
environmental exceptions available under EU law and WTO law. In order to avoid a de facto dis-
crimination against imported green electricity, the tax exemption scheme should thus be based on 
a label which can be fulfilled by both domestic and foreign suppliers of RE electricity and should 
not solely focus on local criteria for production, promotion and markets.50  
3. Trade Remedies  
As discussed in the previous section, competitiveness concerns of Swiss green electricity produc-
ers could be addressed under the differentiated electricity tax scheme by imposing objective crite-
ria to the issuance of renewable electricity certificates based on national environmental standards 
(e.g. requirements to hydro power plants). This section is aimed to look at alternative policy tools 
that could be employed in parallel to a differentiated electricity tax in order to level the playing 
field between domestic and foreign producers of green electricity in compliance with WTO and 
FTA rules. We first address rules relating to off-setting foreign subsidization and then turn to 
safeguards measures.   
Importantly, main trade remedies under WTO law offer the option of unilateral imposition of 
measures by Switzerland. The examination and determination of the lawfulness of these measures 
thus is unilaterally undertaken, but may eventually be challenged by trading partners, in particular 
the EU, before the WTO. Alternatively, foreign subsidies may be directly challenged by Switzer-
land before the WTO.   
 3.1  Available options under subsidy rules  
3.1.1 Application of the WTO Subsidy Agreement in Swiss - EU relations  
The 1972 Free Trade Agreement between Switzerland and the European Union (FTA) essentially 
deals with trade in goods, at the exclusion of services, but also primary agricultural commodities 
(SR 0.632.401). Electricity, in accordance with tariff position 2716 in the International Conven-
tion on the Harmonized Commodity and Coding System (Harmonised System)  
49   Electricity installations based abroad may in principle apply to designate and certify their electricity under the na-
turemade quality label. Naturemade Certification Guidelines (2014), available at  
http://www.naturemade.ch/Dokumente/zertifizierung/Richtlinien_e.pdf, at 9. In practice, however, electricity instal-
lations tend to certify their electricity through the nationally dominant labels. PriceWaterhouseCoopers & WWF 
(2009), Green Electricity Making a Difference, cit., at 20.   
50  PriceWaterhouseCoopers & WWF (2009), Green Electricity Making a Difference, ft. 4, at 11.   
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(www.wcomd.org) and the tariff line 2716.0089 of the WTO Schedule of Concessions (Tariffs on 
Goods, List LIX – Swiss Confederation, 1994 (www.wto.org), is defined as pertaining to the 
realm of goods. It therefore also falls under the disciplines of the 1972 Free Trade Agreement.  
Other than the WTO and GATT 1994, the FTA does not provide disciplines for countervailing 
duties, other than for anti-dumping in Article 24 of the Agreement. Subsidies are merely ad-
dressed in the context of competition rules, and the Swiss Government is of the view that EU dis-
ciplines on subsidies do not apply to Article 23(1)(iii) FTA. The FTA, however, refers in its pre-
amble to the General Agreement of Tariff and Trade and seeks to remove trade barriers in line 
with the disciplines of GATT. Today, such reference relates to the WTO Agreements as a whole, 
and in particular includes Article XVI GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SR 0632. 20 Anhang I(A)13).  
With both the EU and Switzerland being Members of the WTO, the Agreement thus applies be-
tween the Parties, both in relation to the FTA, but also independently between Switzerland and 
the EU as Members of the WTO. The disciplines on subsidies established by the Agreement 
countervailing duties, imposed in accordance with these disciplines, are not pre-empted by the 
FTA and its obligation to eliminate all tariffs and quantitative restrictions. For example, the appli-
cation of the Agreement was discussed in the context of the dispute between the EU and  
Switzerland on differential taxation of holding companies.51 Other than the European Union or 
the United States, Switzerland never transposed the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties into domestic legislation. No special procedures were developed for the purpose of as-
sessing causation and injury of subsidies granted abroad. The same also applies to anti-dumping 
and safeguard measures. This policy of deterring recourse to trade remedies, however, does not 
exclude recourse to these instruments under Swiss Constitutional law and general administrative 
procedures. 
 
Article 101 of the Federal Constitution states52:  
 
1. The Swiss Confederation shall safeguard abroad the interests of the 
Swiss economy.  
2. In special cases, it may take measures to protect the domestic economy. 
It may, if necessary, depart from the principle of economic freedom.  
In legislation, measures of this kind are provided for by the Swiss Foreign Trade 
Act (Bundesgesetz über aussenwirtschaftliche Massnahmen vom 15. Juni 1982 
(SR 946.201). Article 1 states:   
Art. 1 Schutz gegen Auswirkungen ausländischer Massnahmen oder ausseror-
dentliche Verhältnisse im Ausland  
51  See Thomas Cottier & René Matteotti, Der Steuerstreit Schweiz-EG: Rechtslage und Perspektiven, in: Schweizeri-
sches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2006/2007, at 221-256 (Bern/Zürich 2007).  
52  Non-authentic official translation, reproduced in Thomas Cottier & Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation:  
Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland, at 285 (Bern/London 2005).   
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Sofern ausländische Massnahmen oder ausserordentliche Verhältnisse im Aus-
land den Waren-, Dienstleistungs- oder Zahlungsverkehr der Schweiz derart be-
einflussen, dass wesentliche schweizerische Wirtschaftsinteressen beeinträchtigt 
werden, kann der Bundesrat für so lange, als es die Umstände erfordern:  
a) die Einfuhr, Ausfuhr und Durchfuhr von Waren sowie den  
Dienstleistungsverkehr überwachen, bewilligungspflichtig erklären, be-
schränken oder verbieten;  
b) den Zahlungsverkehr mit bestimmten Ländern regeln und gegebenenfalls die 
Erhebung von Beiträgen zur Überbrückung preis- oder währungsbedingter Stö-
rungen im Waren-, Dienstleistungs- und Zahlungsverkehr anordnen.  
For the purpose of tariffs, the Tariff Act (Zolltarifgesetz, SR 632.10) provides the basis for 
measures taking to address extraordinary situations calling for enhanced protection. Article 7 au-
thorizes the Federal Government to increase tariffs and to take other appropriate measures as long 
as necessary:   
Art. 7 Ausserordentliche Verhältnisse in den Beziehungen zum Ausland  
Werden durch ausländische Massnahmen oder ausserordentliche Verhältnisse im 
Ausland die Aussenhandelsbeziehungen der Schweiz derart beeinflusst, dass 
wesentliche schweizerische Wirtschaftsinteressen beeinträchtigt werden, kann 
der Bundesrat, für solange als es die Umstände erfordern, die in Betracht kom-
menden Zollansätze abändern oder, soweit Zollfreiheit besteht, Zölle einführen 
sowie andere geeignete Massnahmen treffen.  
The Government thus is empowered to increase tariffs and take safeguard measures, which in re-
turn, need to comply with international agreements entered into. The broad language of the legis-
lation thus has to be applied in accordance with relevant agreements entered into by the Confed-
eration, i.e. the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the present configura-
tion.   
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement requires governments to set out the methodology for the calcu-
lation of subsidies and countervailing duties in national legislation or implementing regulations. 
Switzerland has neither done so. There are no specific legislative provisions addressing counter-
vailing duties, nor are methodologies defined in regulations. The Government submitted the fol-
lowing communication to the WTO:   
Switzerland has not established an authority competent to initiate and conduct an 
investigation within the meaning of Article 25.12 of the Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing measures… and thus has not, today, taken any countervailing 
actions within the meaning of Article 25.11 of the Agreement and does not antic-
ipate taking any countervailing actions for the foreseeable future (footnote omit-
ted). Switzerland shall promptly notify the Committee on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures… of any changes that may take place in this regard. Specifical-
ly, Switzerland shall notify the Committee pursuant Article 25.11 of the Agree-
ment upon the establishment of the authority competent to initiate and conduct 
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countervailing duty investigations, as well as the domestic procedures governing 
the initiation and conduct of such investigations.53  
 
It may be argued that Switzerland voluntarily refrained from taking recourse to trade remedies. 
Yet, such a view ignores existing legal foundations in the Foreign Trade Act and as well as in tar-
iff legislation discussed above. Moreover, WTO Agreements in Switzerland are open to direct 
application. Given the absence of implementing legislation, the Government directly applied the 
previous Agreement in measures against dumped imports from abroad.54 It is submitted that the 
measures discussed below thus can be directly implemented by the Government, taking recourse 
to general administrative proceedings (Bundesgesetz ¨über das Verwaltungsverfahren, SR 
172.021). However, it would be necessary under Article 14 of the SCM Agreement to specifically 
define the methodology to be applied to a particular case and to communicate these regulations to 
the WTO and its Members, based upon the criteria set out in Article 14 (a)-(d) SCM Agreement.  
It is another issue whether countervailing duties imposed on the basis of the Agreement can be 
successfully challenged before a domestic court of law. Direct effect of WTO law in Switzerland 
is not excluded, but courts showed reluctance to review decisions in particular if they conflict 
with domestic law. It is an issue defined on a case by case basis.55 No case law exists, to the best 
of our knowledge, in the field of trade remedies. Yet, in cases where an administrative law deter-
mination is directly based upon a WTO Agreement, and the issue of challenging domestic law is 
not present, a court of law is likely to review the determination directly invoking the Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.   
On these premises, we turn to the examination of the possibility to impose countervailing duties 
in order to offset subsidies imports of electricity.   
Subsidized imports can be challenged under WTO rules on subsidies. Both the GATT (Article VI 
and Article XVI) and the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) 
provide the possibility of remedies against subsidized imports. The fact that Switzerland equally 
operates feed-in tariffs for renewable energy production does not necessarily neutralise the option 
of trade remedies. While it is possible that counter-claims will be made (as e.g. in the US-EU civ-
il air craft subsidy disputes before the WTO), the legal nature and impact of these measures are 
not identical and do not necessarily imply the same distortions. Trading partners against which 
measures are contemplated may thus threaten to take up, or actually take up trade remedies 
against Swiss feed-in tariffs, as long as they are in place and not replaced by other incentives 
53  G/SCM/N/202/CHE, 21.12.2009.  
54  See Thomas Cottier, Die Bedeutung des GATT im Prozess der Europäischen Integration: eine Untersuchung aus 
schweizerischer Sicht, in: Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod, Dietrich Schindler, Thomas Cottier, EG-Recht und schweizer-
ische Rechtsordnung, at 139 and177, in particular note 113 (Reply of the Federal Council to a motion to introduce 
anti-dumping duties on lumber in the context of measures against then deteriorating Swiss forersts, Amtl. Bull. NR 
1988 p. 639, 694/5.   
55 For a comprehensive analysis see Lukas Engelberger, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit des WTO Rechts in der 
Schweiz: Grundlagen und Perspektiven im Kontext internationaler Rechtsentwicklungen, 7 Studies in Global Eco-
nomic Law (Bern 2004). See also Thomas Cottier & Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Pol-
icy in the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland, at 209, 223-226 (Bern/London 2005).  
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based upon non-discriminatory taxation. However, legally, the two sets of measures have to be 
assessed in separation and on their own. In this context, Switzerland may pursue two different av-
enues in addressing foreign subsidization of exported electricity.  
The one option, so-called unilateral track, consists of unilaterally imposing surcharge tariffs, off-
setting the level of subsidization abroad. The other option is to address the issue of subsidized 
green electricity production abroad is to seek a withdrawal of a subsidy or its modification fol-
lowing the decision of a WTO panel. The latter option reflects the so-called multilateral track un-
der which a country makes use of the WTO dispute settlement system through filing a complaint 
against a subsidy in the WTO. Yet, a complaint can only be made under certain conditions. We 
first turn to this option. 
3.1.2 Subsidy claims before the WTO  
First of all, a support scheme should fall under the legal definition of a subsidy under ASCM Ar-
ticle 1. It means it should constitute a direct or indirect government financial contribution (or in-
come or price support) and provide a benefit to a recipient.56  This does not seem to be always the 
case with support schemes for green electricity. It is not clear whether feed-in-tariff (FIT) 
schemes constitute a subsidy within the meaning of the ASCM. All depends on the design of a 
particular FIT, which differs considerably among countries.57 A FIT that is managed and funded 
by a government will qualify as a subsidy. A FIT that operates without any financial involvement 
of government will not fall under the definition of a subsidy and will not raise issues under WTO 
subsidy rules. It will be considered a regulatory issue, despite financial implications for private 
operators, not unlike those, for example, addressing product or labour standards. The case of 
German FIT is a tricky one. The FIT scheme is implemented through a purchase obligation at a 
minimum price. Reimbursement to utilities is shared among electricity supply undertakings that 
purchase this renewable energy and upstream network operators. The German government acts 
thus only as a regulator, and the funding of the FIT scheme is carried out on a private basis, alt-
hough it is mandated by the government. The German FIT was challenged under EU law, when in 
1998 the German energy company Preussen Elektra brought a claim against the German FIT in 
the district court of Kiel. When the case reached the European Court of Justice, the ECJ did not 
find the German FIT to be a subsidy-based scheme, as the funding under the scheme was secured 
by private entities through the costs being divided among private actors with no involvement of 
government.58  
However, it is important to note that the subsidy definition under WTO law is wider than the def-
inition of a state aid under EU law. The WTO subsidy definition covers also situations where a 
government provides support indirectly (e.g. through payments in a funding mechanism) or en-
56  For a more detailed explanation of the necessary components in the ASCM definition of a subsidy, see Thomas Cot-
tier et al (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU Law and the 
Swiss EEC Free Trade Agreement,  at 42-7, 
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf. .  
57  See e.g. Marie Wilke (2011), Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy Rules: An Initial Legal Re-
view’, Issue Paper no. 4, ISTCD.  
58 See ECJ, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 13 March 2001, Case ECJ. C-379/98 (PreussenElektra), p. 58 ff.  
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trusts a private body to provide a financial contribution.59Thus, a FIT managed by private entities 
on the instruction of a government (e.g. through a governmental regulation/law) may qualify as a 
subsidy under WTO rules. It could be argued however that this applies only to situations where 
the private entity is engaging in a ‘function normally vested in the government which does not 
differ from practices normally followed by governments’.60 Is support of green electricity through 
FIT ‘normal government practice’? When giving the answer to this question, it is important not to 
blur the line between a subsidy and a usual government regulation (commandand-control).61  
Once a support scheme has met the definition of a subsidy, a complaint can be made under the 
premises that the measure constitutes an export or import-substitution subsidy if the measure 
seeks to increase exports of the product at hand. These are subsidies conditioned upon export per-
formance or subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods (either de jure or 
de facto). WTO subsidy law prohibits the use of such subsidies (ASCM Article 3). If a support 
scheme falls in the category of prohibited subsidies, the outcome of a dispute will lead to the ter-
mination of this support scheme without delay (ASCM Article 4.7). This was the case of the feed-
in-tariff scheme (FIT) for renewable electricity that contained local content requirements in the 
Canadian province of Ontario (Canada-Renewable Energy). Even though the Canada Renewable 
Energy dispute left the issue of import substitution subsidy under the ASCM unsettled due to the 
complexity of the subsidy issue in the case and lack of factual evidence, the local content re-
quirements of the FIT were found to constitute a violation of the national treatment (NT) obliga-
tion under the GATT and the TRIMS Agreement. It should be noted that the claim of a violation 
of the national treatment rule and the claim of a prohibited subsidy were made with respect to dif-
ferent products (electricity generating equipment and electricity, respectively).62 The Canada-
Renewable Energy dispute made it clear that FITs with domestic content requirements are not 
consistent with WTO law and thus a no-go for countries intending to support renewable energy. 
However, it did not answer the question of whether a FIT is a subsidy and whether a FIT with lo-
cal content requirements is a prohibited import-substitution subsidy.  
A challenge based upon the category of prohibited subsidies is less likely in the present field as 
the measures of support primarily impact the domestic markets of the country concerned. These 
subsidies in WTO law are defined ‘Actionable Subsidies’ under Part III of the SCM Agreement. 
The complaint can only be successful if in addition to the determination of a measure as a subsidy 
and alleging its specificity (Article 2 of the ASCM), the complaining party can provide evidence 
of adverse effects of the subsidy within the meaning of Article 5 and Article 6 of the ASCM.  The 
legal analysis on the premises of actionable subsidies (i.e. related to the definition of a subsidy, 
specificity and adverse effects) was discussed in detail in the legal opinion on differential electric-
59  See ASCM Art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).  
60  Ibid.  
61  Marie Wilke (2011), Feed-in Tariffs for Renewable Energy and WTO Subsidy Rules: An Initial Legal Review, Issue 
Paper no. 4, ISTCD, at 16.  
62  See Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector (Cana-
da-Renewable Energy), adopted on 24 May 2013, WT/DS412/AB/R,, para. 5.84.  
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ity taxation.63 We stress the importance of providing evidence of adverse effects. A subsidy 
would only be subject to a withdrawal or modification, if adverse effects inflicted by the subsidy 
can be shown and evidenced. In the context of subsidized green electricity imports, adverse ef-
fects could be manifested through the reduction in the production volumes or revenues of Swiss 
hydropower plants.64 Such effects will only be recognised if it can be shown that they are caused 
by the subsidy at hand. It is thus important to the causation link between the injury and the subsi-
dized imports (footnote 11 and Article 15 of the ASCM).   
In sum, WTO subsidy law gives the possibility to bring a subsidy dispute to the WTO and obtain 
a legal remedy through withdrawal or modification of a subsidy.65 The existence of the 1972 FTA 
does not exclude this option. It should be noted, however, that a subsidy claim against foreign 
green electricity support schemes is not settled in case law. The field is in its beginning, and all 
claims and litigation will face legal uncertainty and a lack of predictability of outcomes.   
Bringing a subsidy dispute in the WTO therefore cannot be considered to be the best way to ad-
dress the issue of subsidized green electricity imports. A remedy under this track is not automatic 
but subject to the affirmative finding of a prohibited or actionable subsidy by a WTO panel fol-
lowing the costly and long-lasting66 dispute settlement procedure with uncertain outcomes, much 
depending on the specificities of the programme supporting renewable energies challenged. Fur-
thermore, if the outcome of the dispute leads to a withdrawal or modification of support 
measures, no compensation can be expected from a defending party for past damages (i.e. no 
compensation would be available for Swiss green electricity producers for damages inflicted by 
foreign subsidies).67   
Finally, once a subsidy claim in relation to foreign support schemes for green electricity is 
brought to the WTO, there is no reason for those countries, whose support schemes are being 
challenged, not to bring counterclaims against Swiss renewable energy support measures. This is 
what can be observed as the EU, US, India and China launch complaints in the WTO challenging 
each other’s support schemes for solar panels.68   
In the next section, we look at the possibility to address the issue of subsidized green electricity 
imports through the unilateral track, i.e. charging countervailing duties on subsidized imports.  
63  Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU 
Law and the Swiss EEC Free Trade Agreement,  at 47-78, 
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf   
64  Other cases of adverse effects include nullification or impairment of benefits under tariff concessions and serious 
prejudice to the interests of a WTO member. See Art. 5 of the ASCM.  
65  The Swiss-EU FTA will not be a barrier to such an action. So long as both Switzerland and a country from where 
subsidized imports might originate (e.g. the EU) are WTO Members, they have the right to use the WTO dispute 
settlement system for settling issues arising under provisions of the WTO Agreement.  
66  Up to two years, on average.  
67  See Art. 22.2 of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding.  
68  See the List of disputes brought under the ASCM at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A20.  
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3.1.3 Countervailing duties on electricity imports originating from subsidized power 
plants   
A countervailing duty (CVD) is ‘a special duty unilaterally levied for the purpose of offsetting 
any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, production or ex-
port of any merchandise’.69 The application of CVDs are known as ‘the unilateral track’ under 
WTO rules on subsidies, as the duties are imposed unilaterally by importing countries upon evi-
dence of material injury to a domestic industry from subsidized imports (Article VI:6(a) of the 
GATT and Article 10 of the ASCM). For an affirmative decision on CVDs to be taken, an inter-
nal investigation respecting administrative law proceedings and principles need to reveal that the 
subsidized imports cause or threaten material injury to domestic producers of like products.   
The injury to a domestic industry can be established after an objective examination of the volume 
of the subsidized import (e.g. there is a significant increase in subsidized imports in absolute 
terms or relative to domestic production or consumption), their effect on prices in the domestic 
market for like products (e.g. price undercutting) and the impact of subsidized imports on the 
domestic producers of like products (e.g. decline in output, sales, market share, profits, return on 
investments etc.).70 Again, it is crucial to establish the causal link between the subsidized imports 
and injury to domestic producer(s) of like products.   
CVDs can only be used against the category of actionable subsidies (see section 3.1.2). The sur-
charge tariff imposed must not exceed  the margin of subsidization, i.e. the amount of the subsidy 
provided for the production of imported products (Article VI:3 of the GATT), which is calculated 
on the basis of the benefit conferred by the subsidy to producers of imported products following 
the guidelines of Article 14 of the ASCM. Importantly, the ASCM does not prescribe the meth-
odology to be used for the calculation of the amount of subsidy. WTO Members, which intend to 
use CVDs, have to develop a methodology in line with the guidelines of Article 14 of the ASCM.   
Once a decision on the application of CVDs is taken, a country shall report the measure taken 
without delay to the WTO’s Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 25.11 
ASCM). It is important to note that ‘countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and 
to the extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury’.71 Thus, CVDs are 
imposed on a temporary basis and the investigating national authorities have to periodically re-
view the need for the imposition of CVDs.   
3.1.4 The case for CVDs on certain renewable electricity imports   
As discussed above, CVDs can only be imposed upon a formal investigation of the effects of sub-
sidized imports on a domestic industry. The investigation must reveal that the subsidized imports 
cause, or threaten, material injury to domestic producers of like products. What products should 
be compared here is not entirely clear. The issue of likeness of different types of electricity was 
discussed in our previous study.72 However, the meaning of likeness under the ASCM and the 
69  Art. VI:3 of the GATT and fn 36 of the ASCM.  
70  Art. 15 of the ASCM.  
71  Art. 21.1 of the ASCM.  
72  See Thomas Cottier et al (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity, cit.   
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meaning of likeness under the GATT are not necessarily identical. Moreover, the Appellate Body 
in the Canada-Renewable Energy case pointed out that the determination of relevant market for 
comparison for the purposes of the benefit analysis should take into account not only demandside 
factors but also supply-side conditions, such as ‘the type of contract, the size of the customer, and 
the type of electricity generated (base-load versus peak-load).’73 If it can also be applied to the in-
jury analysis, hydropower electricity could be viewed as being ‘unlike’ electricity generated from 
other sources, including other renewable energy sources. In that case, if a remedy is sought for 
domestic hydropower producers, comparison for the purposes of injury investigation will have to 
be made between domestic hydropower electricity and imported hydropower electricity. CVDs 
could therefore be only applied to subsidized imports of hydropower electricity, rather than to 
subsidized imports of electricity in general. This could significantly constrain the policy space 
Switzerland would have for addressing the subsidy issue through CVDs.   
In practical terms, since CVDs can be applied only against subsidized imports, the implementa-
tion of CVDs on subsidized imports of green electricity also requires the use of certificates with 
the information on the origin of electricity (i.e. a country of electricity generation). If a CVD 
measure is implemented in parallel to a differentiated electricity tax based on the certification 
scheme including tax exemption certificates (TECs), as was discussed in section 2, TECs can also 
be used for the purposes of assessing CVDs. This would imply that upon the submission of TECs, 
green electricity imports would be exempted from the electricity tax same as domestic green elec-
tricity, unless TECs were issued to electricity generators from a country against which CVDs are 
imposed. As TECs are transferred from electricity generators to electricity suppliers, CVDs will 
eventually be reflected in the electricity bill paid by consumers. Finally, when applying CVDs to 
subsidized green electricity imports, it is important to exclude from duties electricity that is mere-
ly in transit through Switzerland. Given the geographical position of Switzerland, this is an issue 
which requires careful further attention. The application of duties on goods in transit would be in 
breach of the provisions of GATT Article V. Yet, since the application of CVDs is likely to be fa-
cilitated by the use of certificates that could also be submitted at the stage of final consumption of 
electricity, the imposition of CVDs on transited electricity could be avoided.  
 3.2  Available options under safeguard rules  
Another policy tool in principle available to Switzerland in order to address competitiveness con-
cerns of Swiss green electricity producers is the use of safeguards in parallel to a differentiated 
electricity tax. Safeguard measures can be used in derogation of GATT rules as a safety valve in 
those cases where a surge of imports causes, or threatens to cause, serious injury to a domestic 
industry.74  Switzerland may lawfully take action against imported electricity provided that do-
mestic green electricity producers suffer from a sharp increase of green electricity imports com-
ing from the country/ies supporting green electricity production. Unlike the SCM Agreement, 
these measures do not imply the demonstration of subsidization. On the other hand, they are lim-
ited in time.   
73 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector (Canada-
Renewable Energy), adopted on 24 May 2013, WT/DS412/AB/R, para. 5.170.  
74  See generally, Fernando Piériola, The Challenge of Safeguards in the WTO, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2014.    
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The use of safeguard measures is admitted by both the GATT Article XIX and the WTO Agree-
ment on Safeguards. As explained above, although Switzerland has not transposed the GATT and 
the Agreement on Safeguards into domestic law, recourse to these instruments remains possible 
as per Article 101 of the Constitution and Swiss Foreign Trade Act75 and the doctrine of direct ef-
fect. Specific provisions dealing with use of safeguards are also included in the 1972 Free Trade 
Agreement between the European Union and Switzerland (Article 24 and Article 27).   
3.2.1 WTO law  
Both the GATT Article XIX and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards provide the possibility to 
adopt safeguards measures. Article 1 of the Agreement on Safeguards states:  
This Agreement establishes rules for the application of safeguard measures which 
shall be understood to mean those measures provided for in Article XIX of 
GATT 1994.  
Accordingly, WTO case law has inferred that safeguards measures need to comply with Article 
XIX GATT and the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards cumulatively.76  Article 
XIX:1 (a) on ‘Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products’, states:  
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations in-
curred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, 
any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such 
increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious in-
jury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive prod-
ucts, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to the ex-
tent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to 
suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the conces-
sion.  
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards also establishes the preconditions allowing recourse 
to safeguards measures:   
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has 
determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being 
imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to do-
mestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause se-
rious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive 
products.  
As per a combined reading of Article XIX GATT and Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safe-
guards, Switzerland may resort to safeguard measures on subsidized imported electricity provided 
the following three conditions are met:  
a. imports of subsidized green electricity increase as a result of unforeseen developments;  
75 See section 3.2.1.  
76  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 81.   
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b. such increase causes or threatens to cause a serious injury to domestic green electricity 
producers;  
c. there is causation between the surge of imports and the serious injury.  
a) Increased imports as a result of unforeseen developments  
According to Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, the increase of imports can be absolute 
or relative. WTO case law has however clarified that the surge of imports must be “recent 
enough, sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough, both quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to cause or threat to cause serious injury”.77 In US – Steel Safeguards, the Appellate Body 
further opined that there is no absolute standard against which to check the fulfilment of these 
four elements, but a ‘concrete’ evaluation must be conducted on a case-by-case basis.78 Such 
evaluation should take into account the rate and the amount of the increase as per Article 4.2 (a) 
of the Agreement of Safeguards. An increase of imports must clearly results from the analysis of 
the import trends during the investigation period.79 The period of investigation, moreover, should 
be long enough and include data relating to the period which immediately precedes the determi-
nation to introduce a safeguard measure.80 Data relating to the most recent past should be given 
more weight.81   
Importantly, moreover, the surge of imports shall occur as a result of unforeseen development as 
per Article XIX:1 GATT. According to the Appellate Body in Korea – Diary, unforeseen devel-
opments means unexpected developments.82 Competent national authorities are required to 
demonstrate that a causal relationship exists between the increase in imports and the unforeseen 
developments. Yet, the two remain “two distinct elements”, in the sense that “[a] statement that 
the increase in imports, or the way in which they were being imported, was unforeseen, does not 
constitute a demonstration as a matter of fact of the existence of unforeseen developments.”83 In 
US – Steel Safeguards, the Appellate Body also clarified that causation between unforeseen de-
velopments and increased imports must be demonstrated for the specific product subject to safe-
guards.84   
Based on these requirements, Swiss authorities would need to prove that imports of green elec-
tricity have recently, sharply, suddenly and significantly increased as a result of unexpected de-
velopments, i.e. the effects of green electricity subsidization leading to an increase in foreign pro-
duction at competitive prices. They would be required to show the rate and the amount of such 
77  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 131.  
78  Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, paras. 352-360.   
79  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear (EC), para. 129.  
80  Ibid., para. 130.   
81  Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 388.   
82  Appellate Body Report, Korea – Diary, para. 84.   
83  Panel Report, Argentina – Preserved Peaches, para. 7.24.   
84  Appellate Body Report, US – Steel Safeguards, para. 319.   
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increase based on statistics showing electricity inflows from the countries. It would need to show 
that these increases are due to the support schemes in a manner which could not be readily fore-
seen at the time. Importantly, green electricity merely transiting through Switzerland could not be 
counted towards the fulfilment of the increased imports requirements. Finally, based on US – 
Steel Safeguards, Switzerland would need to provide evidence of increased imports of those spe-
cific forms of green electricity. To this end, statistics of green electricity inflows would need to be 
broken down into different types of green electricity. In this respect, two sets of difficulties may 
arise. On the one hand, it is uncertain whether the Swiss GOs system, as currently configured, 
may serve the purpose of ‘isolating’ subsidized green electricity imports, especially when elec-
tricity is not purchased by Swiss suppliers by means of bilateral long-term contracts but rather on 
the spot market. On the other hand, depending on whether the WTO dispute settlement bodies 
would consider different types of green electricity to be ‘like’ products or not,85  
Switzerland may have to consider green electricity as a category of itself and thus apply safeguard 
measures on all types of green electricity. Yet, in this case the increased imports requirements 
may be more difficult to prove.   
b) Serious injury of a domestic industry  
Article 4.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards defines ‘serious injury’ as “a significant impairment 
in the position of a domestic industry”. The Appellate Body has interpreted this requirement to be 
stricter than the standard of material injury in the ASCM.86 As per Article 4.1 (c) of the Agree-
ment on Safeguards, moreover, a ‘domestic industry’ consists of “the producers as a whole of the 
like or directly competitive products operating within the territory of a Member, or those whose 
collective output of the like or directly competitive products constitutes a major proportion of the 
total domestic production of those products”.   
The meaning of ‘like or directly competitive products’ is not specified in the Agreement on Safe-
guards. Existing WTO case law clarifying these concepts under the GATT is thus particularly 
important.87 In this respect, the question of likeness of green and grey electricity becomes crucial, 
as well as the potential for distinction between different types of green electricity. This question 
was addressed thoroughly in our previous study.88 In the only WTO dispute on safeguards specif-
ically addressing the question of likeness, however, the Appellate Body affirmed that “the focus 
must be on the identification of the products, and their ‘like or directly competitive’ relationship 
and not on the processes by which those products are produced”.89 Hence, under existing case 
law and depending on the assessment of likeness, Switzerland may not be able, for instance, to 
impose safeguard measures on certain (subsidized) green forms of electricity only based on the 
85  See below in the section on ‘Serious injury of a domestic industry’.   
86  Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 149.   
87  Peter Van de Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 3rd edition (Cambridge University 
Press: 2013), pp. 616-7.   
88 Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Electricity Taxation: An assessment of the compatibility with WTO law 
and EU law”, at 31-7.  
89  Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, para. 94.   
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serious injury suffered from a sole domestic industry producing green electricity (e.g. hydropower 
producers).   
According to Article 4.2 (a) of the Agreement on Safeguards, moreover, the assessment of the se-
rious injury requirement must take into account all relevant ‘injury factors’ having a bearing on 
the situation of that industry. These include the rate and amount of the increase in imports in ab-
solute and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in 
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits, and losses, and employ-
ment. The list provided under Article 4.2 (a) contains the injury factors which must be examined 
but it is not exhaustive.90 Although the Appellate Body clarified that not all injury factors must 
indicate that the domestic industry is seriously suffering, national authorities shall give a reasoned 
and adequate explanation supporting their determination of ‘serious injury’.91 Finally, safeguard 
measures may also be used when a surge of imports “threatens to cause” serious injury to a do-
mestic industry. Under Article 4.1 (b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, this requirement implies 
that a serious injury is “clearly imminent”. In US – Lamb, the Appellate Body clarified that the 
injury must be “on the verge of occurring” and that there must exist a  
“very high degree of likelihood that the threat will materialize in the very near future”.92 Accord-
ingly, data from the most recent past are to be given more weight,93 in view of basing the deter-
mination “on facts and not merely on allegations, conjecture or remote possibility” as per Article 
4.1 (b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.   
c) Causation requirement  
As per Article 4.2 (b) of the Agreement on Safeguards, the causation requirement is fulfilled 
when two conditions are met: (i) there must be a ‘causal link’ between the increased imports and 
the serious injury or threat thereof; (ii) the injurious effects caused by other factors must not be 
attributed to the injurious effects caused by increased imports to the domestic industry.   
The Appellate Body in US – Wheat Gluten interpreted the ‘causal link’ element to mean that there 
must be a genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect between the surge of imports 
and the serious injury caused to the domestic industry. However, other factors may also concur to 
determine serious injury to a domestic industry in combination with increased imports.94 In this 
case, the ‘non-attribution’ requirement demands that either type of effects be distinguished and 
separated by national competent authorities so that they do not attribute to increased imports just 
any injury caused by other factors. As explain3ed by the Appellate Body in US – Lamb:  
The non-attribution language in Article 4.2 (b)…requires that the competent au-
thorities assess appropriately the injurious effects of the other factors, so that 
those effects may be disentangled from the injurious effects of the creased im-
ports. In this way, the final determination rests, properly, on the genuine and sub-
90  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear, para. 136.   
91  Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, para. 131.   
92  Ibid., para. 125.   
93  Ibid., para. 138.   
94  Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para. 67.   
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stantial relationship of cause and effect between increased imports and serious in-
jury.95   
In this respect, Switzerland may lawfully resort to safeguard measures on imports of subsidized 
green electricity only insofar as an evident causal link can be established between increased im-
ports of green electricity and the injury suffered from its domestic sector. Under this requirement, 
that fact that imported green electricity is subsidized does not play a role in the determination of 
causation. In contrast, it may be considered a factor other than increased imports whose effects 
must be clearly separated and distinguished from the effects of the surge of imports in and of it-
self.   
d) Procedural requirements for national investigations  
As explained above, safeguards may be used by a government following an investigation by the 
national investigating authorities pursuant to previously established procedures which shall be 
made public (Article 3 of the Agreement on Safeguards). Similar considerations apply as those 
made in the context of the SCM Agreement. Switzerland may rely upon the Foreign Trade Act, 
but would need to make sure that the procedural requirements are met under Article 8 Safeguard 
Agreement.   
Competent authorities must publish a report with their findings and reasoned conclusions on each 
relevant issue of fact and law. Immediate notification to the WTO Committee on Safeguards must 
occur whenever investigation is initiated, a finding of serious injury or threat thereof is made or 
where a decision is taken to apply or extend the safeguard measure (Article 12.2 of the Agree-
ment). Adequate opportunity for prior consultations with Members affected by the measures must 
be provided (Article 12.3 of the Agreement on Safeguards).  
It is also important to note that safeguards shall apply “only to the extent necessary to prevent or 
remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment” (Article 7.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards). 
Specific time-limits for the application, extension and termination are thus provided under Article 
7 the Agreement and the investigating national authorities have to periodically review the need 
for the imposition of CVDs (Article 7.2 of the Agreement). In this respect, Switzerland may not 
be able to impose safeguards on green electricity for more than 4 years. As a practical matter, 
such measures often stay in force longer and are only removed upon successful challenge in 
WTO dispute settlement. These proceedings may take up to three additional years.   
3.2.2 Swiss-EU FTA  
The use of safeguard measures is also envisaged in the FTA between Switzerland and the EU. 
Under Article 24 of the Swiss-EU FTA, in particular, a safeguard measure may be imposed 
“where an increase in imports of a given product is or is likely to be seriously detrimental to any 
production activity carried on in the territory of one of the contracting parties”. As per Article 
24.1 of the Swiss-EU FTA, contracting parties may resort to ‘appropriate’ measures when the im-
port increase results out of the following two scenarios:   
95  Appellate Body Report, US – Lamb, para.  179.   
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(i) the partial or total reduction in the importing contracting party, as provided for in 
the agreement, of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect levied on the 
product in question;  
(ii) the fact that the duties or charges having equivalent effect levied by the export-
ing contracting party on imports of raw materials or intermediate products used in the 
manufacture of the product in question are significantly lower than the corresponding du-
ties or charges levied by the importing contracting party.   
Specific procedural requirements, in essence similar to those provided under Articles 3 and 12 of 
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, are then set out under Article 27 of the Swiss-EU FTA, to 
which Article 24.2 explicitly refers. Under Article 27.3 (b), in particular, the importing contract-
ing party suffering from increased imports may levy a compensatory charge on the product im-
ported.   
The conditions laid out in Article 24 of the Swiss-EU FTA are somewhat more stringent than the 
requirements provided under Article XIX GATT and the Agreement on Safeguards. Under the 
WTO regime, Switzerland may in principle impose a safeguard measure when a domestic indus-
try is seriously injured by increased imports of a specific product due to any unforeseen develop-
ment. In this respect, Switzerland enjoys a larger margin of manoeuvre under WTO rules. As per 
Article 24 of the Swiss-EU FTA, in contrast, the serious injury must be caused by increased im-
ports resulting out of the effect of tariff concessions. In the case at issue, Switzerland agreed on 
eliminating import duties on electricity coming from the European Union. Yet, it is not because 
of the long-dated 0% tariff binding that a safeguard measures would be needed to provide a safety 
valve to Swiss green electricity producers. This additional requirement essentially excludes re-
course to safeguard measures under the FTA. It may, however, be argued that the subsidization of 
imported electricity de facto amounts to a unexpected distortion of level playing fields equivalent 
to an additional removal of charges having equivalent effect as a tariff duty, causing new harm 
and difficulties to domestic producers.   
The FTA does not exclude recourse under WTO rules and the Safeguard Agreement as an alter-
nate legal basis for such measures (see section 3.2.1 above) In relation to the EU, both instru-
ments need to be applied in combination. An assessment in WTO dispute settlement, however, 
would only rely upon the disciplines of WTO law.   
On these premises, we turn to the examination of the possibility to impose safeguard measures as 
a way of granting temporary relief to Swiss renewable electricity producers.  
3.2.3 The case for safeguards on certain renewable electricity imports   
As discussed above, safeguards can only be imposed upon an investigation ascertaining the injury 
caused by a surge of imports on a domestic industry. Similarly to CVDs, however, Switzerland 
has not instituted a specialized unit responsible for carrying out such investigations. Moreover, 
Switzerland has also never resorted to safeguard measures. This creates hurdles to the implemen-
tation of safeguard measures on imported green electricity which would need to be overcome.   
Should Switzerland establish the necessary  methodological guidelines based upon the Foreign 
Trade Act, the rules and regulations governing administrative procedures and provided that inves-
tigating authorities be able to demonstrate the fulfilment of the substantive injury and the causa-
tion analysis and respect the procedural requirements set out under the WTO Agreement on Safe-
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guards, Switzerland may either apply customs duties on the importation of subsidized green elec-
tricity in contrast with its tariff concessions under Article II:1 GATT and the Swiss-EU FTA, or 
restrict the importation of green electricity through the imposition of quantitative restrictions in 
derogation of Article XI:1 GATT. The latter may be implemented through the curtailment of al-
locable and/or allocated cross-border transmission capacity.96   
In either case, Switzerland would need to track the flow of subsidized green electricity to make 
sure that safeguards are imposed solely on those electricity inflows causing serious injury to its 
domestic sector and, moreover, that no safeguards applies to electricity merely transiting through 
Switzerland. Practically speaking, the implementation of safeguards would thus require the use of 
certificates with the information on the origin of electricity (i.e. a country of electricity genera-
tion).   
It should be noted, however, that the Agreement on Safeguards prescribes, as a general rule, the 
non-discriminatory application of safeguard measures, i.e. Switzerland would need to impose im-
port duties or restrict imports of green electricity on an MFN basis (Article 2.2), including part-
ners in a free trade area or a custom unions.97 In this respect, Switzerland may be able to differen-
tiate the treatment of subsidized and non-subsidized green electricity flowing from different EU 
Member States into the country under limited conditions: (1) based on the so-called principle of 
parallelism, where national authorities were able to conduct their investigations and make their 
determination with respect to subsidized green electricity only;98 (2) as per Article 5.2 (b) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards, where national authorities were able to demonstrate that imports from 
a certain Member/s have increased “in disproportionate percentage in relation to the total increase 
of imports”. In the latter case, however, Switzerland would only be able to apply a quota on the 
importation of subsidized green electricity.99   
Finally, a safeguard measure may also in principle be implemented in parallel to a differentiated 
electricity tax based on the certification scheme including ROs or tax exemption certificates 
(TECs), as was discussed in section 2. Under this scenario, domestic and imported green electrici-
ty would both be exempted from the electricity tax TECs upon submission of TECs, unless such 
certificates were issued to electricity generators from a country against which safeguards are im-
posed. Inasmuch as TECs are transferred from foreign electricity generators to Swiss electricity 
suppliers, the cost of safeguards (namely, the increased cost of imported green electricity after the 
application of an import duty or the higher cost of Swiss green electricity purchased by Swiss 
suppliers in response to the implementation of a quantitative restriction on imported green elec-
tricity) will eventually be passed through in the electricity bill paid by consumers.  
96  See Ilaria Espa, ‘Import and Export Restrictions on Electricity’, conference paper discussed at the World Trade Fo-
rum 2014 on “International Trade in Electricity and the Greening Economy”, WTI 26-27 September 2014, forth-
coming, pp. 5-6.  
97  Appellate Body Report, Argentina – Footwear, para. 112.   
98  According to the principle of parallelism, the imports included in the determination made under Articles 2.1 and 4.2 
of the Agreement on Safeguards should correspond to the imports included in the application of the measure. See 
Appellate Body Report, US – Wheat Gluten, para 96.   
99  As per Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguard, when safeguard measures take the form of quotas which reduce 
the quantity of imports below the level of a recent period (namely, the average of imports in the last three repre-
sentative years for which statistics are available) ‘clear justification’ must be provided.   
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4. Negotiated Solutions and the Ban of VERs   
 4.1  Advantages of a negotiated solution  
The prime function, at this stage, of the law allowing Switzerland to take unilateral measures may 
be to inform negotiations with the European Union and particular Member States. These rights 
may serve as an appropriate leverage in support of bringing about a settlement and compromise 
with a view to reduce the level of subsidization of imported renewable electricity and to discharge 
the pressures on domestic hydropower production. We recall that Switzerland is bound to seek a 
negotiated settlement prior to taking measures under Article XX GATT. The chapeau of this pro-
vision so requires a WTO Member to do under the case law so before measures can unilaterally 
be imposed. Consultations within the WTO also are necessary before unilateral measures relating 
to trade remedies can be implemented. A settlement, of course, does not need to comply with the 
detailed provisions of WTO law and the FTA and procedural and substantive challenges, in par-
ticular demonstrating causality and injury only need to be meet to the extent this is politically 
necessary and feasible   
At the same time, it should be recalled that the WTO Safeguard Agreement prohibits the imposi-
tion of unilateral and voluntary export restrictions. This also applies to negotiated solutions. An 
attempt to seek such measures for example from Germany would meet the resistance of Article 
11(1)(b) and request to this effect by Switzerland will be readily discarded.  Given time pressures, 
it is advisable to explore to what extent these negotiations can be directly held with key Member 
States, in particular the neighbouring countries of Austria, France, Germany and Italy, and to 
what extent this is a matter pertaining the EU on the basis of internal allocations of powers.   
 4.2  Electricity agreement negotiations   
Pending negotiations between the EU and Switzerland on a bilateral agreement on energy offers a 
window to address the issue. RE support schemes are a vital element of the EU energy strategy 
inscribed in the RES Directive discussed above. The RES Directive gives the EU Member States 
the right to determine the level of support for RE production based on the needs of their energy 
sector. It is therefore unlikely that the EU as a whole, or Germany in particular, would denounce 
or phase out their RE support schemes on request of Switzerland. Negotiations, however, could 
focus on criteria and conditions for specific safeguard measures, limiting the amount of subsi-
dized electricity on the basis of ROs and TECs originated in respective countries on a reciprocal 
basis. EU Member states would be entitled to invoke the same restrictions vis-à-vis subsidized 
electricity exported by Swiss based companies on a reciprocal basis. The agreement could also 
address levels of taxation and introduce, and elaborate, the idea of increasing tax rates following 
the principles of tariff quotas without imposing quantitative restrictions properly speaking. Final-
ly, the agreement could seek enhanced cooperation in the production of hydropower in the Alpine 
region in the context of making best use of existing reservoirs and capacities for the purposes of 
renewable energy storage.   
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5. Main Findings   
A national certification scheme (NCS) for renewable electricity such as the one examined in this 
study provides a lawful basis under international law for preferential taxation of renewable elec-
tricity compared to electricity produced from fossil fuels and atomic energy. Hydropower, subject 
to the above-mentioned conditions (potentially including residual water flows), solar energy, 
wind energy, thermal energy and biomass can be subject to lower taxation or the exemption of 
taxation, upon the submission of the certificate either at the stage of domestic production/sale or 
upon importation of renewable electricity.   
The principle of differential taxation for renewable electricity production was set out in the legal 
opinion dated April 18, 2014. We found that different tax rates can be justified under WTO law 
subject to the fulfilment of substantive and procedural requirements for the use of environmental 
and health exceptions. The same holds true for the 1972 Free Trade Agreement with the European 
Union, also taking into account legal developments within the EU. The basic parameters of non-
discrimination (both MFN and National Treatment) are set out that opinion. They are equally val-
id in the present context.100   
From the point of view of GATT 1994, the NCS and its conditions would need in principle to ap-
ply to all producers of renewable electricity within the country and those located abroad. The 
same implicitly holds true under the 1972 FTA with the European Union. All countries need to be 
treated equally and no less favourable treatment should be applied to imported electricity vis-à-
vis domestic electricity. We do not therefore advise to limit certificates to domestic producers.  
The crux of the matter, again, is whether the like product of electricity can be treated differently 
based upon distinctions of source and ways of production. The exclusion of fossil fuel-based elec-
tricity (oil, gas, coal) and nuclear electricity can be justified by taking recourse to the provisions 
of Article XX(g) GATT and Article XX(b) GATT addressing the protection of human, animal 
and plant health. The former includes the protection of the atmosphere and thus combating CO2 
emissions and global warming. The latter allows addressing potential domestic and transnational 
health risks related to the risk of radiation for the population and related to the storage of atomic 
waste. Article 20 of the FTA allows for similar exceptions.     
These exemptions clearly focus on the environment and on public health. Importantly, they do not 
entail privileges accorded on the basis of industrial policy. To the extent that NCS primarily 
serves the purpose of supporting Swiss hydropower plants in light of distorted conditions of com-
petition due to feed-in tariffs, particularly in Germany, or an alternative way to support the new 
renewables (as part of industrial policy) only, the exceptions would not stand and could be chal-
lenged. If such is the prime motive of the scheme, alternative options of subsidization or the im-
position of countervailing duties under the WTO SCM Agreement (to which the FTA refers) are 
more appropriate. Alternatively, recourse to safeguard measures for a period of up to four years 
can envisaged, provided the legal criteria expounded are met and the necessary methodology will 
be developed and communicated, so far lacking in Swiss law. Thus, much depends upon the 
100  Thomas Cottier et al. (2014), Differential Taxation of Electricity: Assessing the Compatibility with WTO Law, EU 
Law and the Swiss EEC Free Trade Agreement,  
http://www.efv.admin.ch/e/downloads/finanzpolitik_grundlagen/els/Differentiatial%20_Taxation_e.pdf   
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proper motivation of the measure as a means to support CO2 reductions and as a means to reduce 
the risks for health and the environment.   
We found that permanent quantitative limitations on certificates for foreign RE electricity outside 
of temporal safeguard measures would be likely to affect the volumes of green electricity import-
ed into Switzerland and would therefore trigger a violation of both WTO law and the FTA provi-
sions regulating trade in goods. Qualitative restrictions on the eligibility of RE electricity certifi-
cates might be defended under both WTO law and the FTA if the same criteria apply to domestic 
and foreign suppliers of RE electricity.  
In conclusion, it is therefore suggested to draft a NCS on that basis, taking into account the expe-
rience made in the United Kingdom. The UK system of tax exemptions under the Climate Change 
Levy scheme is designed on the basis of certificates. It has been in place since 2001. It has not 
been challenged, neither within the European Union nor before the WTO. The system equally ap-
plies to all producers, at home and abroad. Certificates are issued for the purpose of tax exemp-
tion only.101 They can be registered electronically and are not subject to inspections abroad and at 
home. Rather, they rely upon documenting apparent features and mode of production, reducing 
the risk of fraud and cheating.102 Depending on the objective of the Swiss government, these cer-
tificates could be linked to physical flows of electricity as in the UK model. Exports of Swiss 
electricity could be legally exempted in defining the tax base.  
The UK model could be modified though the introduction of additional qualitative criteria to cer-
tification. However, it is important that such a certification scheme be based on formally objec-
tive, country-neutral criteria that permit the use of NCS as a tool to extend a domestic tax regime 
to imports in such a way as to treat domestic and foreign green electricity alike. In this respect, 
some qualitative criteria derived from national environmental requirements and equally imposed 
on domestic and foreign power plants for certification purposes could be envisaged.  Finally, op-
tions should be further studied to take up the matter in negotiations, either with the neighbouring 
countries and the EU within the context of a future agreement on energy. The trade remedy 
measures available under WTO law and the FTA may primarily serve as leverage in support of 
such negotiations. They may be implemented if progress in such negotiations cannot be made. 
The necessary preparations in domestic legislation for guidelines and methodology should thus be 
taken up.   
  
***  
101  OFGEM (2014), Climate Change Levy exemption, available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/environmentalprogrammes/climate-change-levy-exemption.   
102  OFGEM (2014), Ofgem Renewables and CHP Register: System User Guide, available at 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgempublications/87973/renewablesandchpregisteruserguidemay2014.pdf.  
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